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Abstract
The uneasy legal and political settlement regarding abortion in Northern Ireland has long relied on the
outsourcing of  aspects of  reproductive health care. While local health services offer only highly restricted
access to termination procedures, women travel to access abortion services elsewhere. However, technological
changes, in particular the development of  abortifacient medicines, are revolutionising this aspect of
reproductive healthcare. Rather than women having to travel to a service, today that service can travel to
women through the postal supply of  abortion pills, sourced via the internet. While online supply of
pharmaceuticals can pose potential public health risks, at least two groups offer safe and effective telemedical
services to women in Northern Ireland. Women on Web and Women Help Women each supply abortion
pills, under prescription from a doctor based in another country, to women who wish to end a pregnancy of
nine weeks or less. Here, we consider the extent to which the telemedical abortion services that they offer are
protected by transnational law, in particular, EU provisions on cross-border services. This offers new and
hitherto unexplored lines of  legal argument (including defences against criminal prosecution and challenges
to a state’s attempts to restrict the flow of  services). Through claiming the autonomy-based legal relationships
implicit in transnational law and the power that flows therefrom, we suggest, women may challenge
regulatory arrangements which seek to limit their reproductive rights.
Introduction
In April 2016, the first woman in at least a decade was convicted of  illegal abortion inNorthern Ireland.1 Finding herself  pregnant at 19 years of  age and unable to raise the
money to travel to England for a legal termination, she had taken abortion pills sourced
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1     Henry McDonald, ‘Northern Irish Woman Given Suspended Sentence over Self-induced Abortion’ The Guardian
(4 April 2016) <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/04/northern-irish-woman-suspended-sentence-self-
induced-abortion>. A freedom of  information request submitted by Dr Goretti Horgan found that no woman
had been convicted under s 58, Offences Against the Person Act 1861, between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2015
(on file with the authors).
online. Her flatmates reported her to the police. In sentencing her, the judge is reported to
have complained that he was asked to enforce a statute that was 150 years old.2 While the
offence of  ‘unlawful procurement of  miscarriage’ under that mid-Victorian law carries a
maximum penalty of  life imprisonment, he imposed a far lower sentence: three months’
imprisonment, suspended for two years. In the view of  the Northern Ireland Justice
Minister, this was ‘justice . . . tempered with considerable mercy’.3 Another woman is
currently facing charges for having procured abortion pills to allow her teenage daughter to
end an unwanted pregnancy.4 A third prosecution, of  a woman and her partner for allegedly
using medical abortion pills to self-induce an abortion, was recently dropped by the
prosecution in the light of  expert medical evidence of  the risk to the woman’s mental
health, and potentially her suicide, were the case to be publicised. The couple accepted
formal cautions.5
These women faced one of  the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe and one which
has been repeatedly condemned for its gender-discriminatory impact in denying women
treatment that only they need;6 for its negative effect on women’s health;7 for its breach of
women’s rights to privacy8 and to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment;9 and for
its lack of  clarity.10 Criminal justice and health and social care are both devolved matters.
However, notwithstanding such stringent criticism, the Northern Ireland Assembly has
thus far resisted calls for change, recently voting against reform to permit abortion in the
presence of  a fatal fetal anomaly.11 In refusing even this very modest liberalisation of  the
law, Stormont appears out of  line not just with the requirements of  human rights law, but
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2     McDonald (n 1).
3     David Ford, interviewed for the Roger Phillips show, BBC Radio Merseyside, 6 April 2016.
4     Henry McDonald, ‘Pro-choice Activists Picket Derry Police Station over Mother’s Abortion Trial’ The
Guardian (15 July 2015) <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/15/pro-abortion-campaigners-picket-
derry-police-station-mother-prosecution>. A judicial review of  the decision to prosecute is imminent at the
time of  writing. 
5     Alan Irwin, ‘Man and Woman Cautioned over “Abortion Pills” in Northern Ireland’ Belfast Telegraph
(19 January 2017) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/man-and-woman-cautioned-over-
abortion-pills-in-northern-ireland-35378188.html>.
6     Amnesty International UK, The Criminal Law on Abortion: Lethal Foetal Abnormality and Sexual Crime (Amnesty
2015). For discussion of  repeated condemnations of  Northern Ireland’s abortion law by the Committee on
the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women, see Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Advocating Abortion Rights in
Northern Ireland: Local and Global Tensions’ (2016) 25(6) Social and Legal Studies 716.
7     UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of  the United
Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (24 July 2015)
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGB
R%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en> para 17.
8     Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB 96.
9     UN Human Rights Committee, Amanda Jane Mellet v Ireland, 9 June 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/
116/D/2324/2013.
10   Committee on the Administration of  Justice, Submission to the Department of  Justice in Response to their Consultation
on the Criminal Law on Abortion: Lethal Foetal Abnormality and Sexual Crime (December 2014)
<www.caj.org.uk/files/2014/12/02/S439_Submission_to_DoJ_consultation_on_the_criminal_law_on_abor
tion.pdf>.
11    Anon, ‘Stormont Rejects Abortion for Fatal Foetal Abnormality Cases’ RTE News (11 February 2016)
<www.rte.ie/news/2016/0211/767072-abortion-stormont>. This ignored the recommendation of  the
Department of  Justice, The Criminal Law on Abortion: Lethal Fetal Abnormality and Sexual Crime Response to the
Consultation and Policy Proposals (April 2015) para 8.29. For further discussion, see Fiona de Londras, ‘Fatal Foetal
Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law and Mellet v Ireland’ (2016) Medical Law Review (online first,
doi:10.1093/medlaw/fww040); and Aisling McMahon and Bríd Ní Ghráinne, ‘Abortion, Ireland and International
Law’ paper presented at the American Society of  International Law Annual Meeting, November 2016.
also with local public opinion.12 Moreover, in denying women in Northern Ireland the
access to abortion enjoyed elsewhere in the UK, the law is also in clear contravention of
the UK government’s published views on the need to make safe, legal abortion available
as a basic human right.13 This endorsement of  abortion rights for women in developing
countries contrasts markedly with the refusal to ensure the recognition of  such rights for
its own citizens in a devolved region of  the UK.14
While previous critiques of  Northern Irish abortion law have tended to focus on
these important human rights arguments, we explore a further significant issue that has
been ignored to date: how restrictions on women’s home use of  abortion pills within
Northern Ireland fit with transnational trade law. Rather than attempting to discuss the
full range of  relevant regulatory frameworks at stake here (including the law of  the World
Trade Organization and various bilateral or multilateral free-trade agreements), we focus
on obligations within EU law. At the time of  writing, it remains unclear what the post-
Brexit arrangements on trade in medical services will be.15 It is possible that the UK will
enter into some form of  bespoke bilateral trade agreement with the EU, for instance,
modelled on the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)16
or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).17 However, in the absence
of  relevant EU law post-Brexit, where other international trade instruments apply to
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12   Amnesty International, Abortion Research (October 2016) <www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/
default/files/millward_brown_report_of_public_opinion_research_oct_2016.pdf>; LucidTalk, Tracker Poll
(Northern Ireland) (December 2016) <https://lucidtalk.co.uk/images/News/LTDec16TrackerPollResults-
GeneralRpt.pdf>. This most recent poll showed 55.8% in favour of  having Northern Ireland abortion laws
which were ‘totally compatible’ with those in the rest of  the UK, 18.6% in favour of  a more limited
liberalisation, 16.3% in favour of  abortion only when the life of  the mother is at extreme risk and only 7%
against abortion in all circumstances.
13   Department for International Development (DFID), DFID’s Policy Position on Safe and Unsafe Abortion (DFID
2009) <www.pacifichealthsummit.org/downloads/MNH/International%20Guidelines%20and%20Policy%20
Resources/DFID%E2%80%99s%20policy%20position%20on%20safe%20and%20unsafe%20abortion.PDF>
1, 5.
14   Goretti Horgan and Julia S O’Connor, ‘Abortion and Citizenship Rights in a Devolved Region of  the UK’
(2014) 13(1) Social Policy and Society 39. 
15   Prime Minister Theresa May has clarified – <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/full-text-theresa-
may-brexit-speech-global-britain-eu-european-union-latest-a7531361.html> – that the UK will not seek to
remain in the single market, so we can almost certainly rule out the European Economic Area (EEA)
Agreement, which applies EU law of  the ‘single market’ to European Free Trade Association states. This
includes free movement of  goods and services, including medical services, see Art 1(2), 8 and 36 EEA, OJ
1994 L 1/3. 
16   The CETA was signed on 30 October 2016. Most of  the CETA will apply provisionally once the European
Parliament consents and a decision on provisional application is formally adopted by the European Council.
The CETA will come into force only if  adopted by the EU Council with the consent of  the European
Parliament, and by every EU member state in accordance with its national constitutional arrangements. The
EU has entered a reservation under CETA for ‘Retail sales of  pharmaceutical . . . goods, other services
provided by pharmacists’, see Consolidated CETA text, 1298: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf>. The reservation states that for all member states of  the EU with
the exception of  Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia and Ireland, mail order is only possible from member states of
the EEA, thus establishment in any of  these countries is required for the retail of  pharmaceuticals and specific
medical goods to the general public in the EU. The implication is that providers of  medicines by remote
means, such as mail order, could not establish in Canada and sell in the EU. The reservation goes on to state
that in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia and Ireland the mail order of  pharmaceuticals/prescription-only
pharmaceuticals is prohibited. However, such a blanket prohibition has been repeatedly challenged for being
in breach of  EU law, especially by the repeat litigant internet pharmacy DocMorris, most recently in 
Case C-148/15 Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung 19 October 2016 EU:C:2016:776. 
17   The TTIP is now ‘on ice’ following the election of  Donald Trump to the US Presidency. Application to
medical services is one of  its (many) controversial aspects, see Ferdi de Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brugge, The
Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Polity 2016).
cross-border medical services, some of  the opportunities for legal and political
contestation discussed in this paper will continue to apply. Further, regardless of  the
relevance of  EU law to Northern Ireland post-Brexit, our legal analysis applies both to
any prosecutions brought in circumstances where women have used abortion pills pre-
Brexit and also to women in other EU countries – such as the Republic of  Ireland, Poland
and Italy – who are similarly avoiding the strictures of  highly restrictive abortion laws by
accessing abortion pills online.18 While we have chosen not to sacrifice necessary depth
in our discussion of  EU law by also investigating this far broader range of  regulation
here, the general thrust of  our analysis may also apply elsewhere in the world, where other
kinds of  transnational regulation cover trade in medical services.
As we will see, EU law protects patient autonomy and choice, professionals’ access to
extra-jurisdictional patients, and non-discrimination within the EU’s human rights
framework. Further, for the immediate future, the UK will remain a party to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).19 This means that under any bilateral
or multilateral trade agreement with the EU and/or other countries the UK will remain
bound to respect the rights contained in that Convention, as well as the general common
law legal principle of  non-discrimination, in the sense of  treating like situations or
persons alike, in the interpretation and application of  international trade law within its
borders. General conclusions that we draw from how EU law interacts with human rights
law, through obligations of  consistent interpretation of  national laws, thus apply also to
transnational trade law in general and to any future arrangements in the UK post-Brexit.
Issues of  free movement come into particularly sharp focus in a context where safe
and effective abortion pills can be obtained by women in the EU on prescription issued
by an appropriately accredited doctor based in another country. Access to these pills can
play a significant role in promoting women’s reproductive health and autonomy, while
simultaneously – and highly controversially – allowing women to escape domestic
criminal prohibitions against abortion that reflect religious and moral concerns for the
protection of  fetal life. The detailed, technical legal analysis below thus also speaks to far
broader legal and policy debates on the meaning and scope of  ‘autonomy’ in the context
of  EU citizenship rights, the extent to which those rights and autonomy are inevitably
constrained within the logic of  the market, and hence questions of  the scope or reach of
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18   See, generally, Sally Sheldon, ‘How Can a State Control Swallowing? The Home Use of  Abortion Pills in
Ireland’ (2016) Reproductive Health Matters online first: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.10.002>;
Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Pamela Duncan, Alberto Nardelli and Delphine Robineau, ‘Seven in 10 Italian
Gynaecologists Refuse to Carry out Abortions’ The Guardian (11 March 2016)
<www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/11/italian-gynaecologists-refuse-abortions-miscarriages>;
Radhika Sanghani, ‘“Abortion Drone” to Drop DIY Drugs over Poland to Women’ The Telegraph (22 June
2015) <www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11691081/Abortion-drone-to-drop-DIY-drugs-over-
Poland-to-women.html>. An attempt to extend our arguments to the Republic of  Ireland would face the
additional hurdle of  the Protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty, which states that nothing in EU law shall
‘affect the application in Ireland of  Article 40.3.3 of  the Constitution of  Ireland’.
19   It should be noted, however, that the Prime Minister has repeatedly suggested that the UK should leave the
ECHR, although she has recently announced that such plans are ‘on hold’ until at least 2020: Christopher
Hope, ‘Theresa May to Fight 2020 Election on Plans to take Britain out of  European Convention on Human
Rights after Brexit is Completed’ The Telegraph (28 December 2016)
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/28/theresa-may-fight-2020-election-plans-take-britain-european>.
EU law, including into sensitive moral matters;20 and whether the laws and the policies of
the EU are good for women.21
Before considering the relevant EU law, we provide some more detail regarding, first,
Northern Ireland’s abortion law and, second, how women within the jurisdiction are
accessing abortion pills via telemedicine. These details, particularly concerning the groups
who supply the pills and the safety of  the service which they offer, are important when it
comes to distinguishing the application of  EU law in this instance from a situation where
unscrupulous, unqualified providers sell (potentially inauthentic) medicines directly via
the internet, without the involvement of  any medical professional. Given secrecy
regarding the use of  abortion pills in Northern Ireland, in these first parts of  the paper,
we rely in part on information gathered in a series of  fact-finding interviews conducted
with a range of  key actors, including: government officials; family-planning service
providers; support groups; activists; and two not-for-profit groups – Women on Web
(WoW) and Women Help Women (WHW) – which arrange the supply of  abortion pills
to women in Northern Ireland.22 We then consider the relevance of  EU law to these
telemedical abortion services, considering both doctors’ rights to provide services across
borders and patients’ rights to receive them.
Abortion law in Northern Ireland
Criminal prohibitions against abortion in Northern Ireland (as in England and Wales) are
laid down in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 58–9, a statute passed at the
midpoint of  the reign of  Queen Victoria,23 a time that ‘in matters sexual’ was ‘almost
unimaginably different from ours’.24
58 Every woman being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage shall
unlawfully administer to herself  any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully
use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with
intent to procure the miscarriage of  any woman, whether she be or be not with child,
shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like
Abortion by telemedicine in Northern Ireland 5
20   For an early discussion, see Michelle Everson, ‘The Legacy of  the Market Citizen’ in Gillian More and Jo Shaw
(eds), New Legal Dynamics of  European Union (Clarendon 1995); more recently, see e.g. Jo Shaw, ‘A View of  the
Citizenship Classics’ in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of  EU Law (Hart
2010); Phil Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012);
Charlotte O’Brien, ‘I Trade, Therefore I Am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’ (2013) 50 Common
Market Law Review 1643; Loic Azolai (ed), The Question of  Competence in the European Union (Oxford University
Press 2014); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Panos Koutrakos and Phil Syrpis (eds), Exceptions from EU Free Movement
Law: Derogation, Justification and Proportionality (Hart 2016); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties
Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of  Union Citizenship’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 889;
Stephen Weatherill, Law and Values in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2016) 390–2.
21   For a selection of  the literature here, see e.g. Tamara Hervey (ed), ‘Thirty Years of  EU Sex Equality Law’
(2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law Special Edition 4; Claire McGlynn, Families
and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2006); Helen Stalford, Samantha
Currie and Samantha Velluti (eds), Gender and Migration in 21st Century Europe (Ashgate 2009); Eugenia
Caracciolo Di Torella and Anniek Masselot, ‘Work and Family Life Balance in the EU Law and Policy 40 Years
on: Still Balancing, Still Struggling’ (2013) 2 European Gender Equality Law Review 6; Charlotte O’Brien,
‘The EU Speaks the Language of  Gender Equality but only with a Male Voice’ (March 2016)
<http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-eu-speaks-the-language-of-gender-equality-but-with-a-male-voice>.
22   Interviews were conducted by Sheldon as part of  the AHRC project noted above. Interviewees determined
whether they should be cited by name or just by role and, prior to publication, were invited to give approval
for any specific quotations.
23   In Scotland, abortion is subject to common law prohibitions.
24   R (Smeaton) v SS Health and Others [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin), para 332, per Munby J.
intent, shall be guilty of  an offence and being convicted thereof  shall be liable to be kept
in penal servitude for life.
59 Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing, or any
instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used
or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of  any woman, whether she be or be
not with child, shall be guilty of  an offence, and being convicted thereof  shall be liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
The 1861 Act is widely recognised to be badly outdated and in general need of
fundamental reform.25 It was the product of  an all-male Parliament, selected by an
entirely male electorate.26 It reflects the moral conservativism and gender norms of  an
era when women were yet to be recognised as full legal persons27 and when the fact of
having authored a treatise on contraception was sufficient justification for a woman’s
child to be taken out of  her care.28 The offence of  ‘unlawful procurement of  miscarriage’
can be committed from implantation (some 6–12 days after fertilisation) on pain of  the
harshest penalty for abortion foreseen anywhere in Europe.29
The harsh effects of  these draconian provisions have been mitigated elsewhere in the
UK by virtue of  the Abortion Act 1967, which broadened access to abortion services
under conditions of  strict medical control.30 The 1967 Act does not apply in Northern
Ireland. Rather, the small number of  legal abortions performed within the jurisdiction
each year are carried out on the basis of  R v Bourne (1938). Under Bourne, ‘procurement
of  miscarriage’ is considered not to be ‘unlawful’, and therefore not an offence under the
1861 Act, where it is performed for the purpose of  ‘preserving the life of  the mother’.
This phrase has been found to mean that a termination is necessary in order to prevent
the woman from becoming a ‘mental and physical wreck’,31 a test which leaves ‘plenty of
loose ends and ample scope for clarification’.32
While Bourne was afforded a relatively expansive interpretation in the English courts,
permitting a considerable relaxation of  access to abortion before 1967,33 the same has
not been true in Northern Ireland. Here, doctors have historically been more reluctant to
perform abortions and courts have offered a more restrictive reading of  the test,34 with
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25   Law Commission, Reform of  Offences Against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper Consultation Paper (Law
Com No 217 2014) <www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/cp217_
offences_against_the_person.pdf>. Abortion offences were excluded from the Law Commission’s review on
the basis that they raise broader policy issues.
26   Full female franchise was achieved in the Equal Franchise Act 1928. 
27   Until the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, a married woman was not permitted to own, buy or sell
property in her own right. 
28   In re Besant (1878) 11 Ch D 508. 
29   Kerstin Nebel and Steffen Hurka, ‘Abortion: Finding the Impossible Compromise’ in Christoph Knill,
Christian Adam and Steffen Hurka (eds), On the Road to Permissiveness? Change and Convergence of  Moral Regulation
in Europe (Oxford University Press 2015).
30   For an account of  the regulatory challenges posed to the Abortion Act 1967 by the use of  abortion pills, see
Sally Sheldon, ‘British Abortion Law: Speaking from the Past to Govern the Future’ (2016) 79(2) Modern Law
Review 283. 
31   R v Bourne [1938] 3 All ER 615. 
32   Lord Diplock, RCN v DHSS [1981] 1 All ER 545 (QBD, CA and HL), 567. 
33   See, generally, John Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law (Cambridge University Press 1988); Bernard Dickens,
Abortion and the Law (Macgibbon & Key 1966). 
34    See Re AMNH, unreported judgment of  the High Court (Mac Dermott LJ), 21 January 1994, where the judge
noted that the adverse effects to a woman’s health must be ‘real and serious’. Medical opinion towards abortion
appears to be softening: Colin Francome and Wendy Savage, ‘Attitudes and Practice of  Gynaecologists towards
Abortion in Northern Ireland’ (2011) 31(1) Journal of  Obstetrics and Gynaecology 50.
guidance for health and social care professionals issued by the Department of  Health
(DoH) (formerly known as the Department of  Health, Social Services and Public Safety
(DHSSPS)), explaining that a termination will only be lawful where continuance of  the
pregnancy threatens the life of  the woman, or would adversely affect her physical or
mental health in a manner that is ‘real and serious’ and ‘permanent or long term’. A
doctor must form an opinion that this condition is met in ‘good faith’, with this ‘based
upon reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge’.35 Just a few dozen women each
year are deemed to meet these conditions.36
This leaves the vast majority of  women facing unwanted pregnancies within Northern
Ireland without access to lawful domestic services and just three other options. First, a
woman can continue with the pregnancy, with all that entails for her ability to shape her
own future (in terms of  continuing her education, her career or meeting existing caring
commitments) and with the stigma that may follow for a very young or unmarried mother
in the context of  small, tight-knit and, regardless of  any ongoing liberalisation in public
opinion noted above, often morally conservative communities.
Second, if  she is able to rearrange other commitments, make the necessary excuses to
be away and find the required funds in time, she can access legal abortion services outside
the jurisdiction, most commonly in England.37 Over 800 women each year take this
option.38 However, not all women are able to travel: Audrey Simpson, former director of
the Family Planning Association in Northern Ireland (FPANI), offers the example of  a
client, pregnant by rape by a member of  a paramilitary group and simply unable to
disappear for 24 hours.39 More commonly, the £600–£2000 required for the combined
cost of  procedure, travel and accommodation will not be within the means of  all, with
expenses mounting further where the pregnancy is experienced by a minor in need of
accompaniment or where a woman requires an abortion later in pregnancy.40 Women are
not eligible to have any of  these costs met by the National Health Service.41 This leaves
some to ration their children’s food or electricity meter payments while they save for a
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35   DHSSPS, Guidance for Health and Social Care Professionals on Termination of  Pregnancy in Northern Ireland (DHSSPS
March 2016) <www.health-ni.gov.uk/publications/guidance-hsc-professionals-termination-pregnancy-
northern-ireland> paras 2.7–2.8. 
36   Just 30–50 abortions are performed each year in state health facilities, with a small but unknown further
number taking place within the Marie Stopes clinic in Belfast. Numbers have fallen from an earlier average of
70–100 per year (until the mid-2000s), a fact that Horgan attributes to the chilling effect of  government
guidelines. See Goretti Horgan, ‘A Holy Alliance? Obstacles to Abortion Rights in Ireland North and South’
in Aideen Quilty, Sinéad Kennedy and Catherine Conlon (eds), The Abortion Papers Ireland vol 2 (Cork
University Press 2015).
37   For a discussion of  this as an ‘outsourcing’ of  reproductive healthcare for women in the Republic of  Ireland,
see Ruth Fletcher, ‘Peripheral Governance: Administering Transnational Healthcare Flows’ (2013) 9
International Journal of  Law in Context 160. See also Nelleke Koffeman, Morally Sensitive Issues and Cross-Border
Movement in the EU (Intersentia 2015); I Glenn Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics
(Oxford University Press 2015) 318–21, 347–56; and I Glenn Cohen, ‘Circumvention Tourism’ (2012) 97
Cornell Law Review 1309.
38   833 in 2015, representing a significant decline on the 1280 who accessed English services in 2004. Department
of  Health, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2015 (June 2016).
39   Interview.
40   FPANI Women’s European Platform and Alliance for Choice, Submission of  Evidence to the CEDAW Committee
Optional Protocol: Inquiry Procedure (FPANI 2010). 
41   R (A and B) v Secretary of  State for Health [2015] EWCA Civ 771. A decision on an appeal to the Supreme Court
is currently pending. It has been suggested that Scotland might offer free care to Northern Irish women:
Siobhan Fenton, ‘Scotland Considering Offering Northern Irish Women Free Abortions, Nicola Sturgeon
Says’ The Independent (18 November 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/scotland-
considering-offering-northern-irish-women-free-abortions-nicola-sturgeon-says-a7424736.html>.
termination, and others to borrow money from backstreet lenders at exorbitant interest
rates.42 In the words of  Horner J, the restrictions on abortion thus ‘[bite] on the
impoverished but not the wealthy [. . . smacking] of  one law for the rich and one law for
the poor’.43
Faced with this reality, a substantial number of  women take the third option: they
attempt to resolve their problem within Northern Ireland. Historically, on occasion, this
has involved concealed pregnancy and infanticide, as well as the use of  a range of
abortion methods of  highly variable risk and efficacy – including syringes filled with hot
soapy water or disinfectant, or ingestion of  lead plaster or the herb, penny royal.44 While
such dangerous methods are in less common use today, they have not been entirely
eradicated. The Abortion Support Network (ASN), which offers support to women
facing unwanted pregnancies in Northern Ireland, reports contacts:
. . . from women who have drunk bleach and floor cleaner, and who have gone
and gotten three packets of  birth control pills and taken them with a bottle of
gin, and taken all the pills in her medicine cabinet. We had a woman who had
gone out and bought heroin in the hopes that it would make her miscarry. We
heard from a mother of  four who told us matter-of-factly: ‘I’m trying to figure
out how to crash my car to cause a miscarriage but not permanently injure myself
or die.’45
Today, however, a Northern Irish woman seeking to end her own pregnancy is more likely
to rely on abortion pills sourced online and this was the path chosen by the women in the
prosecutions noted above. Our focus in this paper is on the legal regimes surrounding this
practice and, in particular, on the work of  two key groups, which are playing a very
significant role in offering telemedical abortion services to women in Northern Ireland:
WoW and WHW.46
DoH guidance notes that use of  abortion pills obtained via the internet is ‘likely’ to
be an offence under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.47 This phrase
acknowledges that there are circumstances where such use might, on the contrary, be
lawful. One clear-cut case would be where a woman who used the pills was not pregnant
at the time that she took them: if  so, she would not commit an offence as a principal
under s 58. Secondly, whether abortion pills are ‘poisons’ or ‘noxious substances’, which
thus fall within the ambit of  s 58 is a question of  fact, to be determined by a jury. This
point has not been tested in the Northern Irish courts, with the conviction above having
proceeded on the basis of  a guilty plea from the woman concerned. However a
Queensland Court acquitted a woman who had been prosecuted under a similarly worded
law, apparently on the basis that pills which had been safely used by millions of  women
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42   Interview, Mara Clarke, director of  the ASN, a charity that offers practical support to women facing unwanted
pregnancies from Northern Ireland, the Republic of  Ireland and the Isle of  Man. Clarke added that €600
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43   Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application (n 8), para 142. 
44   Leanne McCormick, ‘“No Sense of  Wrongdoing”: Abortion in Belfast 1917–1967’ (2015) 49(1) Journal of
Social History 125.
45   Interview. Colin Francome, Abortion in the USA and the UK (Ashgate 2004) noted that 11% of  Northern Irish
GPs had seen evidence of  attempts at amateur abortion.
46   <www.womenonweb.org>; and <https://womenhelp.org>.
47   DHSSPS (n 35) para 6.7.
worldwide could not, as a matter of  fact, be considered ‘poisons’ or ‘noxious’.48 Finally,
there is also one further, important possibility that we consider in more detail below:
whether a woman treated by a doctor who is based in another country and who relies on
that doctor’s evaluation of  the likely impact of  continuing the pregnancy on her physical
or mental health might fall within the exception carved out by Bourne.49
Abortion by telemedicine within the EU
Sourcing medication online can be a risky business given the difficulty of  identifying
reputable suppliers who will send authentic medicines, the potential lack of  adequate
screening for contraindications, and the variable quality of  information supplied as to
correct use. At the time of  writing, an internet search for ‘buy abortion drugs online’
generates over 50 million hits, bringing up the websites of  many companies prepared to
sell and ship pills to Northern Ireland, some highlighting that no prescription is needed.
Analyses of  purported abortion pills obtained from a number of  websites have found
that some do not contain the relevant active ingredients, while other sites ship nothing at
all.50 Further, even where the correct medicines are supplied, not all sites offer
appropriate information about contraindications to use, how to take the pills properly, or
how to manage any side effects or adverse outcomes. DoH guidance highlights the
general dangers involved in online purchase:
There are a number of  websites which sell abortifacient drugs. Some use online
or telephone based questionnaires to test whether the woman is an appropriate
subject for the service offered; many do not. There is no guarantee that drugs
supplied by these websites are what they are purported to be, and there is no
effective medical supervision of  any woman who decides to use them.51
However, these blanket claims ignore important differences between the various groups
who supply pills and local networks have played a vital role in helping women in Northern
Ireland to identify reputable providers. While we acknowledge the general dangers of
sourcing medicines online, we focus on the work of  two specific suppliers for whom
there is evidence to support the safety of  the telemedical service which they offer: WoW
and WHW. We begin by setting out what is known regarding the incidence of  the use of
abortion pills in Northern Ireland, before providing some more detail regarding WoW
and WHW’s work, and the safety of  the service which they offer.
THE INCIDENCE OF HOME USE OF ABORTION PILLS IN NI
A recent study has revealed that in a period of  six years (2010–2015), 5650 women across
Northern Ireland and the Republic of  Ireland requested abortion pills from WoW, one of
the two providers discussed in this paper, with the numbers of  online consultations more
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48   We consider the safety of  the pills, including when supplied by telemedicine, below (nn 63–81). It should be
noted that UK law is less favourable to such a finding in one important respect. Unlike the offence under the
1861 Act, an offence exists in Queensland even where a woman is not pregnant. The trial judge relied on this
fact in explaining to the jury that, as such, ‘noxious’ must mean that a substance should be ‘noxious’ to the
woman herself: R v Brennan and Leach (unreported, 14 October 2010). The early English case law on the
meaning of  ‘noxious’ provides limited guidance in this context, consisting of  decisions of  lower courts on
very different facts, see, generally, Dickens (n 33) 62–9. 
49   Bourne (n 31). 
50   E.g. WoW’s site lists over 100 ‘scam’ sites: <www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/974/warning--fake-abortion-
pills-for-sale-online>. 
51   DHSSPS (n 35) para 6.6.
than doubling over that period. In 2015, 1438 women were treated.52 While it is
impossible to disaggregate this data, on the basis of  their respective populations it is
reasonable to assume that up to one-third of  these women came from Northern Ireland
and our interviews confirmed that WoW treats women from across all regions of  the
island of  Ireland. The more recently established WHW will not share the numbers of  pills
supplied, emphasising that it is the requests for help that illustrate the true scale of  the
problem. They likewise refer to women on the island of  Ireland as one group, describing
‘daily contacts’ ‘from all over [and] . . . from every age bracket. We have women writing
for their daughters, I’ve had one woman of  over 40, and we’ve had immigrants.’53
Further, regular media reports detail use of  abortion pills within Northern Ireland,54 and
over 200 people have signed an open letter stating that they had either used the pills
themselves to end a pregnancy, or had helped another to do so.55
This suggests that the use of  abortion pills sourced online is likely to offer a
substantial part of  the explanation for the decline in numbers of  women travelling to
England to end pregnancies. Only 833 women in 2015 gave a Northern Irish address at
an English clinic, compared to the 1280 who had done so in 2004.56 While these specific
figures are unreliable, with some women likely to give false addresses in an attempt to
conceal their identities or to access NHS funding, this reduction is so pronounced as to
suggest real change.
Mara Clarke is director of  the ASN, a charity which provides help to women facing
unwanted pregnancies in Northern Ireland, the Republic of  Ireland and the Isle of  Man.
She notes an upward trajectory in the number of  telephone calls received over the last
three years from everywhere except Northern Ireland.57 Her tentative explanation is that
this reflects the number of  women accessing abortion pills directly over the internet, with
no need for support from ASN. Noting that the women who contact them are
increasingly well informed regarding the existence of  abortion pills, with many of  them
also aware of  the work of  WoW and WHW, she suggests that information regarding the
pills would travel more quickly within the smaller, close-knit Northern Irish community
than it would elsewhere.58 This was confirmed by Audrey Simpson, former director of
the FPANI, who told us:
. . . there’s no doubt that women are using [the pills] much more than they did.
It’s much more widely known and Northern Ireland has very close knit
communities – knowledge spreads through communities. If  you can get it for
60–70 pounds, women don’t even care if  it’s safe. As far as they are concerned,
it’s worth the risk, they just need to end the pregnancy.59
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55   Ibid.
56   Department of  Health (n 38). 
57   143 calls were received from Northern Ireland in 2013; 141 in 2014; and 98 by October 2015. This is in the
context of  a rising number of  calls overall: 364 in 2014; 552 in 2014; and over 500 by October 2015. Mara
Clarke, interview.
58   Ibid.
59   Interview.
Clarke also notes that activists in Northern Ireland have been particularly effective in
directing women towards safe service providers. As the artist and activist, Emma
Campbell, explains:
We try to put in information about the pills in every press release, everything we
do, we encourage sharing of  that information – online, in social media, getting
stories into papers . . . We put up stickers on backs of  doors in toilet cubicles and
also in shopping centres. We do banner drops across the motorway. We point
women to WoW and WHW. If  anyone contacts us directly, we tell what we know,
highlighting that we are not healthcare professionals but that we’ve been trained.
. . . [We] tell them it’s the safest thing they can do. After that, they go online, do
the questionnaire, get the drugs shipped straight to their own address in
Northern Ireland. They will arrive within two weeks.60
THE SERVICE OFFERED BY WOW AND WHW
WoW and WHW are online collectives made up of  doctors and trained volunteers. Each
group is strongly motivated by concerns for social justice, reproductive health and
solidarity with women facing unwanted pregnancies.61 Following an online consultation
that screens for a small number of  contraindications, each group will supply mifepristone
and misoprostol (which, throughout, we refer to as ‘abortion pills’) for use during the first
nine weeks of  pregnancy to women in countries where abortion is illegal.62 Each provides
clear instructions as to correct use and advice regarding the symptoms which would
require women to access aftercare. The safety of  abortion pills is well established63 and
each group follows a well-established treatment protocol that is in widespread use
elsewhere in the UK,64 with the only significant variation being that the woman will be
able to take the pills at home at the time most convenient to her (perhaps when her
children are at school or her partner or a friend can be with her). Advice and support is
available by email for as long as the woman needs it.
Each group has been established in a way that takes careful account of  relevant law.
For example, WoW is incorporated in Canada, has offices in the Netherlands, prescribes
the pills from a third country such as Austria, and arranges for them to be shipped from
a reputable supplier of  pharmaceuticals in India. It complies with all relevant regulations
in each of  these countries. Each group requests a donation of  €60–90 for the treatment,
asking that the woman consider giving a greater amount if  she can afford it (so as to
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61   Interviews with two members of  WoW and three members of  WHW. See further:
<www.womenonweb.org/en/page/544/in-collection/6901/why-is-this-help-service-needed>;
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There is No Access to Safe Services’ (2008) 115(9) BJOG: An International Journal of  Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 1171.
62   The treatment protocol used by WoW and WHW, and in use in clinics across the UK, involves the sequential
administration of  mifepristone (an antiprogestin, which acts to block the progesterone receptors causing the
uterine lining to break down and increasing the sensitivity of  the uterus to prostaglandins), followed by
misoprostol (a prostaglandin analogue, which induces uterine contractions that expel the contents of  the
womb). 
63   World Health Organization, Model List of  Essential Medicines 19th List (WHO 2015); Royal College of  Obstetrics
and Gynaecology, The Care of  Women Requesting Induced Abortion (Evidence-based Clinical Guideline No 7,
RCOG 2011) <www.rcog.org.uk/globalassets/documents/guidelines/abortion-guideline_web_1.pdf>; see
further below (nn 65–81).
64   RCOG (n 63).
support access to services for others) and waiving it if  she cannot. Women are screened
for contraindications before pills are supplied and are offered ongoing support by email.
The adequacy of  such arrangements was tested in the Austrian courts in an action,
apparently instigated by the Irish government, attempting to prevent Rebecca Gomperts
of  WoW from supplying abortion pills to women in the Republic of  Ireland. The
resulting judgment confirmed the legality of  Dr Gomperts prescribing pills from Austria,
with the service meeting the relevant legal test in Austrian law for a ‘personal and direct
assessment of  the patient’.65 The Austrian court took account of  the fact that women
who could not legally obtain an abortion were in a particularly desperate situation, finding
that WoW’s work made an overall contribution to Irish women’s health and survival.66
The same reasoning would apply to the situation in Northern Ireland, where the law is
similarly restrictive.
Telemedical abortion services are subject to legal restrictions in many parts of  the world.
However, in places where no such barriers exist, it has been established that they can be safe
and effective.67 Abortion pills are extremely acceptable to women, including when used at
home.68 While women on the island of  Ireland who had accessed pills via WoW commonly
reported serious mental stress caused by their pregnancies and inability to afford travel to
access abortion services elsewhere, almost all felt that home use of  pills had been the right
choice (97 per cent) and one that they would recommend to someone else (98 per cent).69
Few women experience serious side effects as a result of  early abortion using pills and
pain is generally manageable using over-the-counter analgesia.70 One large study found
that rates of  hospital admission due to complications are extremely low, ranging from
0.04 per cent to 0.3 per cent.71 Serious infections requiring hospitalisation are very rare
and it is only in the most extreme of  circumstances (estimated at just 0.03 per cent of
cases) that women require transfusion to replace excessive blood loss.72 Haemorrhage can
be life-threatening if  left untreated and WoW and WHW advise women to plan for it,
emphasising that this makes a planned miscarriage considerably safer than if  the same
thing occurs spontaneously. This is an important limitation of  the care that can be
provided through a telemedical service: while each group provides ongoing support and
advice by email, the medical treatment that they offer necessarily ends with provoking a
miscarriage, with women obliged to seek any necessary aftercare locally. Research
suggests, however, that, given the appropriate information, women can safely self-assess
to confirm that the termination is complete and if  further care is needed.73 Moreover, this
is also the case for early abortions elsewhere in the UK, where women will frequently take
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68   Regina Kulier, Natalie Kapp, A Metin Gülmezoglu et al, ‘Medical Methods for First Trimester Abortion’
(2011) 11 Cochrane Database of  Systematic Reviews Art No CD002855.
69   Aiken et al (n 52).
70   RCOG (n 63).
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72   Ibid.
73   Kevin S Oppegaard, Erik Qvigstad, Christian Fiala, Oskari Heikinheimo, Lina Benson and Kristina Gemzell-
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pills in a clinic and then immediately leave in order to arrive home before their miscarriage
begins. Those women will also monitor their own health and seek emergency care where
needed, albeit with the additional option of  seeking further advice or support by
telephone or face to face from the clinic where they were treated. Further, women often
manage spontaneous miscarriages by themselves at home, with limited medical
supervision. Where medical aftercare is required, health care professionals will be unable
to tell how an abortion has been provoked74 and WoW and WHW advise that there is no
need to disclose the use of  the pills, as the recommended treatment is the same as for a
spontaneous miscarriage.75
All of  our interviewees confirmed that they were not personally aware of  any woman
who had suffered negative health consequences as a result of  the use of  abortion pills and
the activists interviewed were confident that they would have heard about any serious
issues. We were given just one, albeit second-hand, report of  a serious problem. A hospital
doctor had contacted the former director of  the FPANI in the erroneous belief  that her
organisation had advised a woman, now in his care, on how to access abortion pills. The
woman was reported to be suffering from a ‘life-threatening’ condition, but no further
detail was offered as to whether this was a result of  inauthentic medication, incorrect use,
or whether she had sought treatment for a recognised side effect of  the pills.76
While this report raises concerns, an evaluation of  telemedical abortion nonetheless
needs to compare it to the alternatives available to women, as outlined in the introduction.
First, alongside the social, emotional and financial harms that come with continuing an
unwanted pregnancy to term are the very real clinical risks of  so doing: pregnancy and
childbirth carries a significantly higher risk of  morbidity and mortality than a safely
performed abortion, particularly in early pregnancy.77 Second, while this is less well
documented, it is also likely that the need to travel to obtain an abortion has negative
health consequences.78 Northern Irish women who end pregnancies in England will do
so slightly later than resident English women, reflecting the problems that some women
will face in making arrangements and securing the necessary funds, increasing the risks to
their health.79 Third, it is well documented that, where unable to access safe abortion
services, some women will try other extreme measures to end a pregnancy (some of
which we noted above). These are generally either exceedingly dangerous, likely to be
ineffective, or both. It is noteworthy here that the availability of  abortion pills is credited
with making a contribution to the global reduction in the number of  women’s deaths that
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for NI women: Department of  Health (n 38).
result from illegal abortion each year (from 56,000 per year in 2003 to 47,000 per year in
2008), with most deaths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa where abortion pills are not
widely available.80
There is thus good reason to suggest that telemedical abortion services, as offered by
WoW and WHW within Northern Ireland, meet the best standards of  patient care and
safety that are available given the context in which they are offered. These groups offer
women a choice which allows them to avoid the risks of  other methods of  illegal abortion
and the significant physical, emotional, social and financial burdens of  continuing an
unwanted pregnancy. As noted by the Austrian court cited above, these groups’ work
makes a material contribution to women’s health and survival.81 However, controversially,
their work also enables women to avoid legal prohibitions on abortion designed to
recognise the moral significance of  fetal life and to prevent or to condemn its intentional
destruction.82
The discussion above raises a range of  important ethical, political and legal questions.
In what follows, we focus on just those that relate to the compatibility of  Northern
Ireland’s restrictions on women’s access to abortion pills with the entitlements of  doctors
and patients in EU law. Our focus is on the relevant EU economic law; there are also
important considerations of  EU human rights law, which we note but do not develop
here. The issues raised are both complex, technical legal matters regarding the appropriate
interpretation of  EU law in this context, and also broader social, ethical and political
questions regarding the nature of  the EU’s internal market law, the role of  fundamental
human rights in shaping the EU legal order, the possibility for states to recognise and
protect fetal life in ways that restrict reproductive rights and impact negatively on
women’s health, and the means by which EU (health) law alters relationships between
doctors, patients and health systems. We now turn to these questions.
EU health law, Northern Irish law and access to abortion services
Others have considered how European law (which includes EU law and the law of  the
ECHR) applies to access to information about or the advertising of  abortion services.83
In SPUC v Grogan,84 the European Court of  Justice (CJEU) decided that abortion
constitutes a ‘service’ within what is now Article 56 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU (TFEU) and that women have the right to obtain information regarding abortion
services in another jurisdiction. The European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), in
Open Door, similarly recognised that women have a right to information under the ECHR
regarding services offered in other states.85 The importance of  the latter case is explicitly
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recognised in the official DoH guidance on abortion in Northern Ireland, which
provides that:
Women may seek advice on access to, or availability of, termination of  pregnancy
services in other jurisdictions. Information on such services is in the public
domain and accessible from a range of  sources including magazines, television
and the Internet. If  requested, health professionals may inform women of  the
availability of  information on these services to ensure that the woman is able to
come to a fully informed decision.86
While the principle established by Grogan and Open Counselling is significant, these cases
date from the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time of  very different technological
possibilities, when women would have needed to travel in order to access abortion
services in another jurisdiction. Today, however, as described above, the combination of
internet-based telemedical provision and abortion pills makes it potentially very safe, as
well as considerably cheaper and more convenient, for women to access abortion services
without travelling. Indeed, it is important to recall that the position of  a woman (in
Northern Ireland) who receives a package in the post with the relevant medicines,
following a consultation over the internet, is not very different in any respect material to
her health to that of  a woman accessing early abortion services in an English clinic. As
described above, in the case of  each woman, the pills will very often take effect outside any health
institution and without any medical professionals present, usually in the woman’s own home. Each
woman is screened for contraindications before pills are offered and each has access to
hospital care in the very unlikely event that she should need it.87
The DoH guidance makes no reference to what information may lawfully be offered
regarding the safety of  home use of  abortion pills or where they may be safely accessed.
Indeed, its rather cumbersome language might suggest that guidance has been carefully
drafted precisely in order to avoid taking a position on this point: it notes merely the
legality of  giving advice regarding services offered where the woman is ‘present in
another jurisdiction’.88 We would suggest, however, the provision of  accurate information
regarding the services offered by WoW and WHW is also potentially captured by the
rights at play here, given that each is involved in the provision of  lawful services ‘in other
jurisdictions’.89 As such, the guidance might usefully go further in setting out women’s
rights to accurate information regarding the lawful services thus offered. We return to this
point below.90
The other hugely significant change since the 1980s is to how EU law interacts with
medical treatment and health care. In general, EU law on services has burgeoned since
the 1980s,91 including not only a great deal of  CJEU case law, but also detailed economic
legislation on electronic commerce which applies where services are supplied across a
border, with the provider and the recipient in different countries, such as in the work of
WoW and WHW. EU law has therefore moved beyond the relatively simple situation at
issue in Grogan, which involved interpretation of  only the EU Treaty law as it applies to
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information about services where the service recipient crosses a border. A more dense
EU legal environment on services applies today. In addition, although we are not able to
cover the technical detail in this paper, the EU’s human rights law has also developed
enormously, and rapidly, in the past few decades.92
More specifically, Hervey and McHale, and others, take the view that ‘EU health law’
has altered legal relationships between patients, doctors and the state.93 EU law has had
effects on some areas of  health law since the 1960s, but in the last couple of  decades the
areas covered by EU law have both broadened and deepened significantly. This justifies
conceptualising the relevant legal provisions through the logics of  ‘EU health law’, rather
than of  EU law more generally. Without going into too much detail here, the general
trend of  EU health law has been towards the enhancement of  patient autonomy and
choice,94 and the securing of  greater professional mobility, including through recognition
of  the ability of  doctors who are licensed to practise in one EU state to treat patients who
are in, or are citizens of, other EU states.95 There are exceptions to this general trend but,
as exceptions, they must be narrowly construed. Whether these trends apply also in their
strong form to other transnational legal orders is a question for another paper, but some
see an emerging ‘global health law’ as encompassing entitlements of  patients and
providers within paradigms of  ‘medical tourism’, which may radically reconfigure
arrangements for health services in states across the globe.96
We now explore the extent to which EU health law supports doctors providing, and
women seeking to access, telemedical abortion services. As noted above, our specific
focus here is on the work of  two groups: WoW and WHW. Whether our legal analysis also
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applies to other groups that offer to supply abortion pills would depend on a case-by-case
consideration of  the service which they offer including, significantly, the role played by
appropriately credentialled medical professionals within it and adherence to best available
standards of  clinical practice. In our exploration, we bring together two key and inter-
related aspects of  EU health law: professional regulation and patient autonomy.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION IN EU HEALTH LAW
EU health law (legislation and provisions of  the TEU and TFEU, interpreted by the
CJEU) seeks to protect and promote the ability of  health professionals to operate across
internal EU borders. It does not go so far as to construct healthcare professionals, such
as the doctors in WoW and WHW, entirely as entrepreneurs operating within an
unregulated market of  28 countries. But it does see them as professionals regulated
essentially by the state in which they choose to establish themselves, while being able to
offer services to consumers (patients) in other member states.97
The potentially relevant EU law includes Article 56 TFEU, the ‘Services Directive’,98
the Directive on the mutual recognition of  professional medical qualifications,99 and the
e-commerce Directive.100 As this latter is the lex specialis, we focus our analytical attention
here, although the arguments apply equally to litigation under the other Directives, or
Article 56 TFEU. The e-commerce Directive covers provision of  services across EU
borders, including medical consultations undertaken through a website.101 A ‘service’ in
EU law must attract remuneration, though this can be provided by a third party,102 and
the service provider need not be seeking to make a profit.103 In general, under the
Directive, the rule is that prohibitions on services provision applicable to (health)
professionals within the UK must not extend to providers of  such services lawfully
established in another member state, such as WoW or WHW,104 unless justified by
objective policy interests.
Abortion by telemedicine in Northern Ireland
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98   Directive 2006/123/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on services
in the internal market [2006] OJ L376/36, although actually it excludes health care services, see Article 2(2)(f).
99   Directive 2005/36/EC (n 97).
100  Directive 2000/31/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects
of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (e-commerce
Directive) OJ 2000 L 178/1. Implemented in the UK by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations
2002 No 2013.
101  The e-commerce Directive does not apply to ‘telephone consultation of  a doctor’: e-commerce Directive
(n 100) Art 1(2), 2(a), referring to Directive 98/43/EC, Art 1(2), and Annex V. Electronic Commerce (EC
Directive) Regulations 2002 No 2013, reg 2.
102  Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders EU:C:1988:196.
103  Case C-281/06 Jund EU:C:2007:816.
104  Member states ‘may not . . . restrict freedom to provide information society services from another Member
State’: e-commerce Directive Art 3(2); Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 No 2013, reg 4.
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PATIENT AUTONOMY IN EU HEALTH LAW
What about the legal position of  the women who use abortion pills obtained online? EU
health law seeks to protect and promote the ability of  patients to access medical treatment
across internal EU borders. As with professionals, EU health law does not construct
patients, including the women seeking to access services from WoW or WHW, solely as
consumers able to choose services within an unregulated market of  28 countries.
However, EU health law does see patients as autonomous actors enabled by EU law to
contract or interact in other ways with service providers established in any EU member
state whose regulatory arrangements they choose to trust.105 WoW and WHW are
providing a ‘service’ within EU law, even if  a particular woman does not pay for it herself,
because there is an indirect payment by other women who are able to donate more and
who cross-subsidise those who are unable to pay. At the same time, EU health law is
attentive to patients’ human rights, including the civil and political rights that protect
dignity and autonomy often associated with health settings (for instance, rights to consent
to medical treatment and to privacy), as well as perhaps the social ‘right to health care’.106
The consequence of  the relevant rules is that patients may in practice escape the
regulatory regime of  their ‘home state’ and this has been recognised in EU law since at
least the 1980s.107 The question, considered in detail below, is whether those rules apply
even in situations where the home regulatory regime seeks to impose restrictions
grounded in health or consumer protection, or in moral values. All of  the above
potentially applies also in the context of  other transnational trade agreements, including
the post-Brexit arrangements in the UK, depending on the precise modalities of  the
agreements and their applicability to medical services.108
The potentially relevant EU law includes Article 56 TFEU, the e-commerce Directive,
and the ‘Patients’ Rights Directive’ 2011/24/EU.109 The underlying idea behind Directive
2011/24/EU is to ‘provide rules for facilitating the access to safe and high-quality cross-
border healthcare’.110 This is in the spirit of  free movement of  health services within the
internal market. The Directive seeks to bring legislative certainty to a phenomenon that
had attracted significant litigation based on Article 56 TFEU: cross-border patient
movement within the EU.111 Despite its name, however, there are in fact no substantive
entitlements of  patients (or indeed health care professionals) within the Directive that
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Elchinov EU:C:2010:581; C-512/08 Case C-490/09 Commission v France (Major Medical Equipment)
EU:C:2010:579; Commission v Luxembourg (Medical Laboratory Tests) EU:C:2011:34.
106  Hervey and McHale (n 93) chs 7 and 8.
107  See Cases C-286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone (n 97); Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan (n 84). See also, in the
English context, R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex parte Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687, and the
discussion in Derek Morgan and Robert Lee, ‘In the Name of  the Father? Ex parte Blood: Dealing with
Novelty and Anomaly’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 840; Tamara Hervey, ‘Buy Baby? The European Union
and Regulation of  Human Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 207.
108  On such ‘medical tourism’, see e.g. Cohen (n 37); I Glenn Cohen, ‘Medical Tourism and Global Justice’ and
‘The Proportionality Problem in Cross-Border Reproductive Care’ both in Cohen (n 96); Cortez (n 96).
109  The ‘General Services Directive’ 2006/123/EC (n 98) does not apply to health services.
110  Directive 2011/24/EU (n 97) Art 1.
111  See case law cited above (nn 97 and 105). 
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apply to the activities of  WoW and WHW. The Directive does not have any explicit
provisions about remote arrangements for medical treatment.112 Even the mutual
recognition of  prescriptions provisions113 are applicable only where a prescription has
been issued in one member state and the patient seeks to have it fulfilled in another
member state, which is not the case here.
Instead, a woman in Northern Ireland seeking to rely on EU law, for example, in
defending a criminal prosecution or challenging any attempts to restrict her access to the
abortion services offered by WoW or WHW,114 would have to rely on either the 
e-commerce Directive, or the general rule in Article 56 TFEU. Such measures of  EU
health law give rights to recipients of  services. They require that ‘restrictions’ on free
movement of  services must be justified by objective public interests.
RESTRICTIONS ON PATIENT AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY IN EU HEALTH LAW
A preliminary question to be determined is whether the issue at stake here concerns
freedom to provide and receive services or, rather, the free movement of  goods. It could
be argued that the threat of  criminal prosecution for supplying, procuring or using
abortion pills to procure a miscarriage is not necessarily restricting the provision of  the
service of  the consultation per se, as an offence is only potentially committed at the point
that abortion pills are supplied, procured or used. If  so, the restriction or obstacle to trade
would not be the provision or receipt of  the service itself: WoW and WHW may lawfully
provide consultations inasmuch as these are only imparting information about the
options available to a pregnant woman in Northern Ireland, in much the same way that
information about travelling to England for abortion services was secured by EU law in
the Grogan case. Any legal issues would then fall to be considered under EU rules on free
movement of  goods. Here the relevant legislation includes the significant body of  EU law
on marketing authorisation for pharmaceuticals.115
The implications of  this EU legislation for national consumer/patient protection and
health policies were at issue in the DocMorris case.116 An internet pharmacy lawfully
established in the Netherlands offered prescription and non-prescription medicines to
patients in Germany. German law prohibited the private importation of  medicines, which
were required by German law to be handled only through pharmacies. The CJEU held
that national rules implementing EU consumer/patient protection legislation by requiring
that pharmaceuticals must have marketing authorisation are not ‘restrictions’ on free
movement of  goods where they apply to medicines not authorised in Germany.
Otherwise, the EU pharmaceutical marketing authorisation system, which requires an
authorisation for each member state, could be easily circumvented. Neither patients nor
health professionals may autonomously deploy EU free movement law so as to avoid the
protection provided by that EU legislation.
The CJEU held that an absolute prohibition on the sale of  authorised non-
prescription medicines through the internet is an unjustified breach of  EU free
movement law. Such a prohibition on prescription medicines, including where prescribed
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113  Directive 2011/24/EU (n 97) Art 11.
114  The availability of  EU law as a defence in a criminal prosecution has been recognised since the 1970s, see Case
148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti EU:C:1979:110.
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by a doctor established in another member state, is a prima facie breach, which must be
justified.117 The pills supplied by WoW and WHW are authorised for marketing in the UK
and, indeed, are used in Northern Irish abortion services. If  EU free movement of  goods
law is deemed to apply to WoW and WHW’s work in Northern Ireland, the question will
be whether the restriction on free trade in pharmaceuticals entailed in Northern Ireland’s
abortion law is justified under EU law and we consider this matter below.
However, given the nature of  the transaction at issue, to argue that this is really about
products, and not the e-commerce service of  remote provision of  abortion services
across borders, would seem far-fetched. The consultation, the issuing of  the prescription
and the provision of  the pills are so closely bundled118 that the threat of  prosecution
must be understood as prohibiting or at least significantly impeding (‘restricting’ to use
the term of  the Directive) the health professional from providing, and the woman from
receiving, the service across internal EU borders. The legal concept of  a ‘restriction’
under the e-commerce Directive, and EU case law on the Treaty rules, is a broad one. It
encompasses any rule or practice which impedes or makes it more difficult for a service
to be received across borders in the EU.119 Where professional qualifications regulation
is such a ‘restriction’, qualifications from one member state must be recognised in other
member states, again unless justified.120
To summarise: current Northern Irish law constitutes a prima facie breach of  EU
freedom of  movement provisions, most likely on services. We turn now to the key
question of  whether this breach can be justified.
DEROGATIONS FROM PATIENT AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY IN EU HEALTH LAW
Member states may derogate from the rule prohibiting restrictions on professionals based
in one member state from offering e-commerce services in another,121 or on patients
from receiving those services, if  necessary for ‘public policy, in particular the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offences . . . public health . . . the
protection of  consumers’; or where the service presents a ‘serious and grave risk of
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117  Para 124.
118  See, for a parallel, the CJEU’s approach to interpretation of  a consumer contract involving bundled services
and (health-related) products in Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika bt v ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete
EU:C:2010:725.
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(n 97) para 94. See Hervey and McHale (n 93) 77–83; Gekiere et al (n 93); Hancher and Sauter (n 93).
120  This is a long-established principle of  EU law, see Case 71/76 Thieffry EU:C:1977:65; Case 340/89 Vlassopoulou
EU:C:1991:193 and is also enshrined in EU legislation, see Directive 2005/36/EC (n 97).
121  E-commerce Directive (n 100), Art 3(4). Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 No 2013, reg 5.
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prejudice to those objectives’.122 In general, and particularly where an area is not
harmonised by EU legislation, the CJEU respects national decisions about acceptable
risks to health123 or consumers, and national articulations of  morality. Nonetheless, and
importantly, derogations must not violate mutual recognition of  protections in another
member state where equivalent safeguards can be found,124 must respect mutual
recognition of  professional qualifications where provided for by EU legislation,125 and
must be part of  proportionate, consistent and evidence-based national law and policy,
designed to achieve its stated objectives.126 In this regard, the CJEU gives considerably
less discretion to national decision-makers than the ECtHR, Strasbourg, or indeed the
WTO decision-making authorities. Justifications for departing from EU free trade law,
including their implications for professional and patient autonomy, are narrowly
interpreted as exceptions to a rule. When interpreting the relevant EU law (including
internal market legislation), compliance with the protection of  human rights, long
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protect the relevant public interest and notify the European Commission. European Commission reports
suggest there have been no notifications on protection of  minors, or protection of  human dignity: see
European Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/expert/presentation
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EU:C:2000:496; and Case C-159/00 Sapod Audiac EU:C:2002:343. However, this would involve a change of
direction from the CJEU, so we do not discuss it further here.
123  For a discussion on the changing approach of  the CJEU to human health protection derogations, as the EU
legislature increasingly harmonised the fields of  risk regulation in communicable diseases, see Tamara Hervey,
‘The Role of  the European Court of  Justice in the Europeanization of  Communicable Disease Control:
Driver or Irrelevance?’ (2012) 37 Journal  Health Politics, Policy and Law 975–98.
124  E-commerce Directive (n 100) Art 3(4)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii). Case C-55/94 Gebhard EU:C:1995:411; Case 
C-275/92 Schindler EU:C:1994:119.
125  Directive 2005/36/EC (n 97).
126  As the CJEU put it in Case C-137/09 Josemans EU:C:2010:774, para 70: ‘a restrictive measure can be
considered to be suitable for securing the attainment of  the objective pursued only if  it genuinely reflects a
concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner’. See, for instance, in the context of
health services, Case C-490/09 Commission v Luxembourg (Laboratory Analyses) EU:C:2011:34; Case C-169/07
Hartlauer EU:C:2009:141, para 55; Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others
EU:C:2009:316, para 42; see Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky Association and Others v The Lord Advocate and The
Advocate General for Scotland EU:C:2015:845; and in other contexts, such as gambling services, see e.g. Case 
C-42/07 Bwin International EU:C:2009:519, para 61; Case C-316/07 Stoß EU:C:2010:504, para 97; Case C
390/12 Pfleger EU:C:2014:281, paras 40–56. The CJEU adopts a strict scrutiny of  public morality as an
objective public interest justifying restrictions on free movement of  services or goods, with particular care to
decline to accept any double standards, see e.g. Case 121/85 Conegate EU:C:1986:114, concerning import of
sex toys, and Cases 115&116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille EU:C:1982:183 and Case C-268/99 Jany and Others
EU:C:2001:616, concerning prostitution.
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recognised as inherent in the EU’s legal order, and now found in the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR),127 is also required.128
What public policy is served by the current legal restrictions on abortion in Northern
Ireland which might potentially justify a derogation from the principles of  free movement
in EU law? The abortion prohibitions contained in the 1861 Act have typically been seen
as justified by two broad purposes: the promotion of  public (women’s) health and the
protection of  fetal life.129 With these broad purposes in mind, the former recognised
separately by EU law,130 how might the UK argue that Northern Ireland’s abortion laws
satisfy EU law’s requirements? The discussion below shows that this is not as easy as
might be assumed, leaving scope to argue that Northern Irish law is importantly
inconsistent with EU law.
First, if  relying on the public health or consumer protection justification, the UK
would have to show that Northern Irish law actually works to protect health and/or
potential consumers of  abortion services, or to prevent a risk of  harm to (women’s)
health or to consumers.131 However, as described in some detail above, the abortion
services offered by WoW and WHW are both safe and effective for the woman
concerned.132
Mifepristone and misoprostol are prescription-only medicines. The CJEU’s reasoning
in DocMorris recognises the legitimacy of  national controls on prescription-only
medicines, arising from the greater risks of  harm if  misused than for non-prescription
medicines, the consequent risks arising from false or forged prescriptions, the need to
ensure that the medicines reach the correct person, and the need to secure efficient use
of  public money.133 The German ban on sale of  prescription medicines through internet
pharmacies was justified on these grounds. Surely a ban on internet-based provision of
prescription-only abortion pills would be similarly justified?
We think not. The telemedical services offered by WoW and WHW must be
distinguished from the services offered in DocMorris, with none of  the successful
arguments in DocMorris engaged. Under the EU’s pharmaceuticals legislation, the decision
of  whether to authorise medicines as prescription-only on patient protection/health grounds is
a matter for the member state within which the medical professional who issues a
prescription is established. Too great an interference with this principle (such as a total
ban of  a particular pharmaceutical being privately imported into a different member state,
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about the disproportionality of  the Northern Irish law.
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nn 140–59 and accompanying text. 
132  See above (nn 65–81).
133  Paras 117–23.
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where that pharmaceutical is authorised) would be a disproportionate infringement of  the
Treaty rules on free movement of  goods,134 as well as freedom of  establishment (of
pharmacists, but also presumably of  other medical professionals, including the doctors
who prescribe medicines). The mutual recognition of  professional qualifications, also
secured by EU legislation, equally highlights the disproportionality of  such an approach.
It follows that compliance with domestic laws and the licensing of  mifepristone and
misoprostol in the countries in which the WoW and WHW doctors are professionally
registered, and the authorisation of  those medicines in Northern Ireland, precludes an
absolute ban on cross-border mail-order trade on the grounds of  protection of  health.
Further, any negative health consequences of  telemedical use of  abortion pills need
to be balanced against the health consequences of  the alternative options available to a
woman, as discussed above.135 There is overwhelming evidence to support the claim that
restrictive abortion laws are very harmful to women’s health,136 and there are thus good
public health arguments to support the service that WoW and WHW provide. Indeed, as
noted above, using pills to end an early pregnancy is far safer, not just than alternative
(illegal) methods of  ending that pregnancy, but it is also much safer for the woman
concerned than continuing it.137 As was recognised in the Austrian courts, these services
make a strong and positive contribution to the health and survival of  women in countries
where abortion is heavily restricted.138 This interpretation, to the effect that restricting
Northern Irish women’s access to the services offered by WoW and WHW is not a
proportionate policy designed to achieve the objective of  protecting health, is also
consistent with human rights recognised in EU law.139
If  there is a convincing justification for Northern Ireland’s restrictive abortion policy,
then, this must lie in a second broad concern: with the moral status of  the fetus (a ‘public
policy’ justification in EU law). The e-commerce Directive refers in particular to ‘the
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of  criminal offences, including the
protection of  minors . . . and violations of  human dignity concerning individual
persons’.140 In making the assessment of  whether such policies are proportionate,
account must be taken of  the action already taken by the other member state to protect
that particular interest.141 So one might argue that, although domestic law in the
Netherlands and Austria does not prioritise the protection of  the fetus over the pregnant
woman’s interests in the same way as Northern Irish law does, there is no doubt that law
in each jurisdiction does offer some protection to it (for example, in restricting access to
abortion later in pregnancy).
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136  Gilda Sedgh, Susheela Singh, Iqbal H Shah, Elisabeth Åhman, Stanley K Henshaw and Akinrinola Bankole,
‘Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008’ (2012) 379 Lancet 625–32.
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140  E-commerce Directive (n 100), Art 3(4)(i)(a).
141  Case C-76/90 Säger EU:C:1991:331.
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While many EU countries seek to deter abortion, however, the restrictiveness of  the
law in Northern Ireland marks it as a clear outlier,142 making it more difficult for the UK
to demonstrate that the restrictions which it imposes offer a proportionate response
compared to other available approaches. The repeated criticism of  the extremely harsh
criminal penalty and the refusal to provide abortion services even very early in pregnancy
or in specific, limited circumstances (such as in the presence of  a fatal fetal anomaly or
where pregnancy results from a sexual assault)143 indicate the disproportionality of  the
Northern Irish position.
In the context of  free movement of  services under Article 56 TFEU, the CJEU has
held that ‘public policy’ must be interpreted strictly. It may only be relied on if  there is a
‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of  society’.144 The CJEU
has long recognised that protection of  human rights may, in principle, constitute such a
fundamental interest, which justifies a member state in derogating from the Treaty rules on
freedom to provide services and free movement of  goods.145 So if  Northern Ireland’s
public policy seeks to protect the human rights of  the fetus,146 it seems unarguable that
this is a proportionate restriction, provided that there is no other way of  achieving that aim
which is less restrictive of  free provision of  services across national borders in the EU.
But this argument would require – very controversially – defending the position that
a fetus is to be regarded as a holder of  human rights in EU law. Such an interpretation
would be fundamentally incompatible with current abortion law in almost every EU
member state. Neither the CJEU147 nor the Council of  Europe’s ECtHR148 has decided
to this effect in any context. To adopt this position is, in effect, to argue for a broad
interpretation of  the ‘public policy’ derogation, where the normal approach of  the CJEU
is to adopt a narrow interpretation. In our view, it is inconceivable that such an explicit
position would be taken by the CJEU, given that the ECtHR has consistently rejected any
attempt to recognise that a ‘right to life’ can be held by a fetus149 and that the EU CFR
explicitly provides that the meaning and scope of  EU CFR rights which correspond to
ECHR rights is the same as those of  ECHR rights,150 and interpretation of  its other
provisions is to be with due regard to inter alia the ECHR.151
However, the potential scope of  a ‘fundamental interest of  society’ is far broader than
a concern with protecting human rights. Even if  it is not accepted that the fetus can be a
human rights holder, a member state might nonetheless assert a fundamental interest in the
protection of  fetal life. The issue of  the moral status of  the fetus in EU health law goes
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143  Committee on the Administration of  Justice (n 10).
144  See e.g. Case C-54/99 Église de Scientologie EU:C:2000:124, para 17; Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, para 30.
145  Case C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254; Case C-275/92 Schindler EU:C:1994:119; Case C-36/02 Omega (n 144);
Case C-341/05 Laval EU:C:2007:809; see also Case C-438/05 Viking EU:C:2007:772 on freedom of
establishment.
146  The right to life of  the unborn is not in itself  a right in the EU CFR, although the right to life is. See further
Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Article 2 – Right to Life’ in Peers et al (n 92).
147  See Case C-34/10, Brüstle v Greenpeace eV EU:C:2011:669; Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v
Comptroller General of  Patents, Designs and Trade Marks EU:C:2014:2451.
148  P and S v Poland No 57375/08 (ECtHR 2012); A, B, C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032; Vo v France No 53924/00
(ECtHR 2004).
149  Vo (n 148).
150  EU CFR, Art 52(3).
151  EU CFR, Preamble, and Explanations. For an extended discussion, see Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘The Explanations
Relating to the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union’ in Peers et al (n 92).
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to the question of  whether the life or health of  the fetus justifies a restriction not only on
trade, but also on the rights of  the pregnant woman to dignity and autonomy, and the
freedom of  the WoW and WHW doctors to pursue a profession. The discretion enjoyed
by a member state over public policy, expressed as a moral position, is constrained
(through the legal doctrine of  proportionality) by the impact of  the exercise of  that
discretion over entitlements of  individual women and health professionals to exercise not
only trade rights, but also human rights, across EU borders. Taking an interpretation which
saw protection extended to the fetus on moral grounds could constitute a breach of  the
woman’s right to respect for private and family life, right to integrity of  the person, right
to liberty and security of  the person, freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, and
human dignity. It may also breach the equality or non-discrimination provisions of  the EU
CFR, as the restriction is on a medical service needed only by women, so discriminates on
grounds of  sex.152 Furthermore, in practice women who are less likely to be able to leave
Northern Ireland to procure abortion services include women with disabilities that make
it difficult for them to travel and women with less disposable income. Disability is an
explicit ground for non-discrimination in the EU CFR. Although poverty is not, Article 21
EU CFR refers to property, birth and age as forbidden grounds and, more importantly, the
list in Article 21 EU CFR is not exhaustive.153 A wide interpretation of  the public policy
derogation, thus, potentially breaches equality or non-discrimination provisions in this
regard too. The freedom to choose an occupation of  the doctors in WoW and WHW is
also potentially breached.
These observations take us into familiar territory of  the ‘balancing’ of  different
interests using human rights frames. The ‘public policy’ derogation in EU law implies
national discretion in reaching such a balance.154 If  adopted here, that approach would
favour the status quo. The 1861 Act’s application in Northern Ireland would be respected
through an interpretation of  EU law which respects the rights articulated in the EU CFR,
as understood through the lens of  national ‘margin of  appreciation’.155 However, this
would not necessarily be the approach of  the CJEU. From the inception of  its human
rights jurisprudence, the CJEU has articulated human rights interpretation as a matter of
EU law,156 not a matter entirely of  deference to national settlements.
Taking the example of  the ‘right to human dignity’, which is particularly pertinent to
abortion, consider the Omega case, which concerned laser quest games.157 The CJEU on
that occasion paid particular attention to the interpretation given by a particular member
state (Germany) to the ‘right to human dignity’.158 In order to be justified, it was not
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152  See above (n 6).
153  It protects ‘any ground such as …’.
154  The European court with the longest pedigree of  doing so is the ECtHR, Strasbourg. Without wanting to
over-generalise, when it comes to balancing competing human rights claims, the ECtHR tends to respect the
positions reached in legislative (or even policy) settlements in particular countries. See e.g. William A Schabas,
The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015); Bernadette Rainey,
Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford
University Press 2014). 
155  For a detailed recent discussion of  the margin of  appreciation as it operates in this specific context, see
NIHRC’s Application [2015] NIQB 96.
156  Case 29/69 Stauder v City of  Ulm EU:C:1969:57; Case 4/7 Nold EU:C:1977:1; Case 11/70 Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114. Note, however, that the CJEU has – like all courts which decide
‘constitutional issues’ – also been attentive to the politics of  its decisions, especially those involving human
rights arguments, see e.g. the cases cited above (nn 84, 144, 145, 147).
157  Omega (n 144) paras 34, 37. See also Case C-124/97 Läärä EU:C:1999:435 and Case C-67/98 Zenatti
EU:C:1999:514.
158  Omega (n 144) paras 37, 39, 40.
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necessary that the German approach corresponded to a common conception of  human
dignity, shared by all member states. Indeed, proportionality does not require consistency
of  approach across member states. There is scope, therefore, in EU law, for outlier
positions on human rights interpretations. However, in Omega, as in other decisions
concerning human rights, the CJEU explicitly asserts ‘human dignity’ as a principle of  EU
law.159 It does not apply the national conception of  human dignity per se. So while the
CJEU might respect the Northern Irish position as a human-rights-consistent derogation
from free movement rules, this is far from certain.
Finally, we must consider the question of  the consistency of  policy within the
boundaries of  one member state. It is virtually impossible to see how existing Northern
Irish law can be argued to be necessary and proportionate to protect public health or consumers
when different rules apply elsewhere in the UK. We note that relevant English law
(notwithstanding the medical exception to the 1861 Act carved out under the Abortion
Act 1967) also potentially breaches EU law. A woman using the services of  WoW or
WHW to obtain pills that she could use at home in England to end an early pregnancy160
would potentially be criminally liable under the Act, because her abortion would not have
taken place in an NHS hospital or other approved premises or have been authorised by
two doctors, as is required under s 1 of  the Abortion Act 1967. In the unlikely event that
such a woman were prosecuted, the UK would need to justify the place of  provision and
authorisation requirements of  the Abortion Act, because, on their face, they constitute an
unlawful breach of  EU law on free movement of  services, as they impede the practice of
WoW and WHW doctors who are lawfully established and operating in full compliance
with regulatory obligations in another member state.161 Simply arguing that high quality,
safe abortion services are already offered free of  change on the NHS would not
constitute sufficient justification, as it is tantamount to an argument to the effect that the
arrangements for lawful abortion services in other member states do not secure patient
safety. Further, the Abortion Act has itself  been criticised as imposing restrictions on the
use of  abortion pills that cannot be justified in terms of  the best available standards of
clinical practice.162 It would be difficult to show that such a prosecution (however unlikely
to occur with regard to an abortion procured within the period of  early pregnancy for
which WoW and WHW offer services) would be proportionate to the restriction on
women’s receipt of  abortion services and the freedom of  WoW and WHW to supply
services across borders.163
However, whether clinically grounded or not, domestic legal restrictions impact far
less severely on women’s access to abortion services in England, highlighting the
disproportionate effect of  the Northern Irish legal response to abortion and the far
greater need for WoW and WHW’s services within that jurisdiction. The very anomaly of
the Northern Irish law, and its lack of  attention to significant evolution in clinical
practice, goes directly to the lack of  credibility of  the legal argument from
proportionality. There can be nothing different about the proportionality test’s balance in
terms of  public health or consumer protection based on whether the woman concerned is in
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Offers Abortions on the High Seas’ The Times (2 Supplement, 22 October 2014).
161  The principle that restrictions on place of  establishment/residence rules breach Art 56 TFEU is long
established: see Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen EU:C:1974:131.
162  Sheldon (n 30).
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England or Northern Ireland. If  something is judged to be safe in England, it must also
be judged to be safe in Northern Ireland. Unlike the protection of  biodiversity arguments
that justified a restriction on keeping of  bees on the Danish island of  Læsø,164 or the
detailed and explicit public health data that justified different alcohol pricing in
Scotland,165 there is nothing (other than the difference in approach to public policy) to
suggest otherwise. It follows that maintaining a different conception of  consumer
protection or public health for only one part of  the UK is highly unlikely to meet a
proportionality test.
What about the public policy derogation? In general, the EU’s legal structures – like
those of  all transnational trade agreements, which are agreements between states –
construct the ‘society’ within which ‘fundamental interests’ are to be protected as
coterminous with the UK, the party to the relevant treaties.166 Nonetheless, in the early
years of  EU membership, public morality derogations (from free movement of
pornography) were accepted where the legal expression of  those morality standards
differed between the different nations of  the UK.167 In this regard, the CJEU accepts the
internal national constitutional identities of  the member states, and their constituent
parts, when interpreting EU law.168 However, again this case can clearly be distinguished
from that of  telemedical abortion services. With regard to the free movement of
pornography, the CJEU accepted that the UK policy as a whole was consistent (and hence
justified) by reference to whether:
. . . [the relevant] laws, taken as a whole, have as their purpose the prohibition, or
at least, the restraining, of  the manufacture and marketing of  publications or
articles of  an indecent or obscene character. In these circumstances it is
permissible to conclude, on a comprehensive view, that there is no lawful trade
in such goods in the United Kingdom.169
Because there was no lawful trade in such pornographic goods within the UK, it was
permissible for the UK to prohibit their import from another member state. By contrast,
with regard to abortion services, women in England, Wales and Scotland are able to
access lawful domestic services using pills as, indeed, in very rare and highly restricted
circumstances, are women in Northern Ireland. Further, DoH guidance explicitly
envisages that a woman might travel to access such a service, with the only difference
lying in the mode of  supply of  the service (whether the service itself  or the patient
crosses the border). Taking account of  all of  this, and the extent of  policy inconsistency
concerned, a mere divergence in views between Northern Ireland and the rest of  the UK
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164  Case C-67/97 Criminal Proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme (the ‘Danish bees case’) EU:C:1998:584.
165  In the context of  public health protection, there is a single recent example showing that it is possible to justify
such measures, but only if  detailed appropriate empirical data supports a different approach in just one part
of  a member state, see Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky Association (n 126).
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168  Art 4(2) TEU. The CJEU has interpreted this provision, inter alia, in the context of  different approaches to
online gambling laws in the German Länder, see Case C-156/13 Digibet EU:C:2014:1756. However, online
gambling should be distinguished from online abortion services, given the established safety of  abortion pills,
because the dangers to consumer and health protection from gambling are significantly contested, leaving
greater national discretion to justify restrictive policies, see e.g. Stanleybet International and Others EU:C:2013:33,
para 44.
169  Case 34/79 Henn and Darby (n 167) para 21.
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regarding how the moral status of  the fetus should be recognised in law170 is insufficient
to constitute a clear justification for the derogation from EU law.171
Recall also that the rules preventing access to lawful services are liable to impact
primarily on those women who are unable (for example, because of  their relative poverty,
a disability, or caring commitments) to access abortion services in another country. In
permitting women to access services by travelling to England or another country (and
even facilitating this, by explicitly permitting the provision of  advice regarding this
option), Northern Irish law and policy is not only inconsistent but also discriminatory. If
there is no objection to (wealthier, physically able) women travelling to receive abortion
services, there can be no ethical justification on the grounds of  the moral value of  fetal
life for objecting to the pills themselves ‘travelling’ (for less wealthy, less able women to
use). In the circumstances we have investigated and with regard to the broad purposes
which might be argued to support the restrictive Northern Irish law, there is no material
difference between a Northern Irish woman who procures pills from WoW or WHW and
a Northern Irish woman who obtains them following a consultation in, say, an English
clinic and leaves immediately having taken them (other than that the latter risks managing
a miscarriage on her journey home). To repeat: the only difference is in the ‘mode’ of
supply of  the service concerned. Can this really be sufficient to constitute a proportionate
policy response? Add the significant international data demonstrating that restrictive laws
do not actually end abortion and, indeed, the lack of  data to show even that they reduce
its incidence,172 and – in our view – the most convincing answer lies in the negative.
To recap: we have shown above that the doctor seeking to treat a patient with abortion
pills is entitled, in principle, to rely on the rule in EU law of  free movement and access
to consumers/service recipients in other member states and that a woman facing an
unwanted pregnancy is entitled to access the services thus offered. We have also set out
the circumstances in which a state is entitled to derogate from these rules, describing the
possibility of  claiming an exception either on the basis of  public health and consumer
protection; or on the protection of  a fundamental public policy interest (here, the
protection of  fetal life). The law discussed above is complex and we have shown that its
application in this context raises a range of  novel points. As such, the ultimate outcome
of  such a dispute is impossible to predict with certainty. However, what is vital is that the
legal burden of  establishing that a derogation from free movement rules can be justified
lies on the member state concerned, and our analysis suggests numerous important
hurdles that a state would struggle to overcome in making such a case. As such, we
proceed on the basis that EU health law should be interpreted so as to give doctors and
Northern Irish women rights to provide and receive the services provided by WoW and
WHW across borders. We now explore some of  the consequences of  this conclusion for
the law in Northern Ireland, outlining how the principles of  EU law discussed above
might be operationalised in practice.
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APPLICATION OF EU HEALTH LAW TO TELEMEDICAL ABORTION SERVICES IN
NORTHERN IRELAND
In general, although international treaties are binding,173 states are free to determine how
they meet their international obligations. In a ‘dualist’ state like the UK, treaties do not
automatically become part of  domestic law. But the doctrine of  ‘consistent interpretation’
means that there is a presumption of  compliance with international obligations in the
interpretation of  subsequently adopted UK law.174 In the context of  the EU Treaties
(under the European Communities Act)175 and the ECHR (under the Human Rights
Act),176 this obligation of  consistent statutory interpretation extends also to previously
enacted legislation. Future legislation implementing the UK’s post-Brexit trade agreements
with the EU will thus also be subject to the obligations in the Human Rights Act.
In addition, EU law has some qualities that international law, even international human
rights law, does not share. In addition to the obligation of  consistent interpretation,177 some
provisions of  EU law are ‘directly effective’ – that is to say, are potentially a source of  rights
enforceable by individuals within national courts,178 and of  corresponding obligations.179
For example, from the very earliest cases,180 the direct effect of  a provision of  EU law has
been available as a defence in criminal proceedings. Within the EU’s sphere of  competence,
the ‘supremacy’ of  EU law also requires national courts to apply EU law in priority over
conflicting national law, which must be ‘disapplied’, irrespective of  the date of  enactment,
or of  normative or constitutional priority.181 EU law requires ‘an effective remedy’ for
everyone whose ‘rights and freedoms’ in EU law have been violated,182 even where the
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direct effect of  EU law: Pickstone v Freemans [1989] AC 66; Litster v Forth Dry Dock [1990] 1 AC 546.
176  Human Rights Act 1998, s 3, which ‘applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever
enacted’ provides ‘so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read
and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’; Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004]
UKHL 30; R v Secretary of  State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (n 174).
177  Case C-106/89 Marleasing EU:C:1990:395.
178  National courts are obliged to comply with EU law, see Art 4(3) TEU. In general, if  a state adopts a ‘monist’
approach to ordinary international law, all international law is ‘directly effective’ in its legal system.
179  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos EU:C:1963:1.
180  Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti EU:C:1979:110.
181  Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105; Case 106/77 Simmenthal EU:C:1978:49; Case 6–64 Costa v
ENEL EU:C:1964:66.
182  EU CFR, Art 47; see e.g. Case C-177/88 Dekker EU:C:1990:383; Case C-430&431/93 Van Schijndel
EU:C:1995:441; Case C-213/89 Factortame EU:C:1990:257; Case C-6&9/90 Francovich EU:C:1991:428.
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violation is by national courts.183 These qualities of  EU law are politically controversial –
particularly at the current time, when the shape of  future relations between the UK and EU
is under discussion – but they have been accepted by courts in all the member states,
including the UK.184
It follows, firstly, that the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 must be interpreted
in accordance with these doctrines. In the case of  EU law, if  a consistent interpretation
is impossible, the Act must be ‘disapplied’, logically leaving the matter to be settled under
the common law. As we explained above, the 1861 Act is currently interpreted in such a
way that ‘procurement of  miscarriage’ is not considered ‘unlawful’, and thereby criminally
prohibited, where it is performed for the purpose of  ‘preserving the life of  the
mother’.185 This exception, carved out by Bourne, which justifies the provision of  abortion
services on the grounds of  a patient’s mental and physical health, has historically been
subject to a very narrow interpretation within Northern Ireland. However, Bourne offers
a notoriously vague test and one which rests heavily on the good faith view of  the doctor,
allowing considerable scope for clinical discretion.186 If  interpreted consistently with the
EU law rights of  the doctor to supply cross-border services, and with due respect to that
doctor’s clinical judgement, recognised as equivalent to that of  a doctor established and
lawfully providing medical services in Northern Ireland, this opens the possibility for
establishing an exception to criminal prosecution under the 1861 Act. In short, a doctor
established in another EU member state, must be accorded the same freedom as a doctor
based within Northern Ireland to reach a clinical judgement to the effect that an abortion
is necessary to avoid a serious adverse effect on the woman’s health and, accordingly, to
offer appropriate treatment.
While there are few facts in the public domain regarding the case of  the Northern
Irish mother facing prosecution, it seems highly plausible that such a good faith medical
opinion might have been reached in the case of  her daughter, a minor seeking abortion.
Furthermore, once it has been decided that the doctor has acted lawfully, within the
exception carved out by Bourne, then logically neither can the woman being treated by that
doctor have committed a criminal act, given that there has been no ‘unlawful’ miscarriage
within the terms of  the 1861 Act. Moreover, any attempted prosecution of  others
involved in supply or procurement of  the pills (such as the mother) would also fail to
meet the requirement for prosecution under s 59 that the pills were to be ‘unlawfully used
or employed’. Neither the doctor, nor the woman using the abortion pills, nor indeed
anyone who had helped her to do so, would have committed a criminal offence. In this
way, both the doctor’s and the woman’s rights in EU law are granted ‘effective judicial
protection’ through the doctrine of  consistent interpretation. Where this non-
discriminatory treatment is not secured, either the doctor or a woman could challenge any
criminal prosecution on the grounds that it infringes EU law as an unjustified restriction
on her freedom to provide, or to access, cross-border services. Any attempt on the part
of  the Northern Irish authorities to justify prosecution would need to satisfy the
requirements of  EU law and we have argued above that they would face important
hurdles in their struggle to do so.
A post-Brexit agreement liberalising trade in services, when implemented into UK law,
will need to be interpreted consistently, if  possible, with human rights obligations in the
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Human Rights Act. Equally, it must be at least arguable that, in the future, if  the
agreement gives rights to receive and provide cross-border medical services, Bourne should
be interpreted consistently with both the trade agreement’s implementing legislation and
the Human Rights Act.
Secondly, it also follows from the doctrine of  consistent interpretation that any
official guidance on abortion issued by the Northern Irish government should reflect
transnational norms in its interpretation of  the applicable domestic law. Current DoH
guidance is flawed in failing to do so, in that it seeks to establish a more restrictive reading
of  the Bourne judgment than is consistent with the UK’s human-rights-consistent
obligations in EU law.187 Its sweeping judgement that ‘there is no effective medical
supervision’ of  pills sourced from websites is flawed in failing to recognise that some of
these pills are offered on prescription from doctors lawfully established elsewhere in the
EU, following an online or telephone consultation, with follow-up care and advice
available for as long as the woman needs it.188 It thus breaches EU law proportionality
principles in that it fails to take into account the differences between the services such
doctors provide and the undoubted dangers of  procuring pills online from unscrupulous
providers. Indeed, if  the concern is truly with the danger that vulnerable women might
suffer at the hands of  the latter, then this might more usefully be translated into a prompt
for official guidance that allows women to identify safe, reputable suppliers, and facilitates
the provision of  accurate information regarding correct use of  abortion pills and when
to seek further care.189 A complainant who can establish locus standi might thus seek to rely
on EU law to bring a judicial review action, arguing that the DoH guidance is an
unjustified policy response in that it fails to express adequately the applicable law.
Finally, EU law might be invoked, again through judicial review, should the necessary
locus and admissibility rules be satisfied, to challenge any attempt by the Northern Irish
authorities to prevent the physical importation of  abortion pills. Given the ‘bundling’ of
the provision of  the medical service with the provision of  the pills, such an act on the
part of  customs authorities would be a prima facie (and, we argue, unlikely to be justified)
restriction on freedom to provide and receive services in EU law.190
Conclusions
The conviction of  a young woman for unlawful procurement of  miscarriage and the
ongoing prosecution of  a mother who had sought to support a pregnant teenage daughter
faced with Northern Ireland’s highly restrictive prohibitions on abortion each highlight a
law that is poorly aligned not just with human rights norms,191 but also – as we have
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demonstrated above – principles of  EU law, and transnational trade law more generally.
The women involved in each case could have accessed lawful termination services by
leaving Northern Ireland, resulting in treatment with exactly the same safe and effective
medicines. If  they had done so, EU and ECHR law would have protected their rights to
obtain information regarding services offered in another member state and to travel to
make use of  them. However, travelling for abortion care imposes a heavy burden on
women and is particularly difficult or simply impossible for some, including for reasons
of  disability, age, or poverty.
In this article, we have discussed the case where abortion services travel to women,
focusing on the work of  two not-for-profit groups, WoW and WHW. While the principles
of  EU law involved are complex, contested and raise many novel issues for resolution, we
suggested that they nonetheless raise important and hitherto unexplored legal arguments.
Notably, they are significant in the interpretation of  Bourne, with implications for
individual prosecutions; they suggest the need for revision of  existing official guidance
for health and social care professionals on abortion services in Northern Ireland; and they
might potentially be invoked to challenge any attempt to interrupt the supply of  abortion
pills across borders. More generally, legal challenges brought on the basis of  EU law can
sometimes offer broader opportunities for litigation as a political strategy, highlighting the
extent to which domestic law is out of  step with contemporary European norms and
clinical developments, and contributing pressure for domestic legal reform.192
There is no doubt that using EU law in an attempt to defend or extend reproductive
rights in Northern Ireland would be highly controversial and, considering the failure of
even very moderate attempts to reform abortion law to date, that it would meet
significant political resistance. Contestation regarding the application and effect of  EU
law is always acute in those cases where deeply entrenched social or moral values differ
across the EU.193 We are acutely aware that, in a context of  ongoing heightened
controversy regarding Brexit and the current perilous state of  the Northern Irish peace
process,194 any attempt to assert EU principles as a basis for disrupting domestic legal
provisions on an issue as deeply contested as abortion is particularly fraught with danger.
While these risks are real, however, appreciation of  them should not detract from an
awareness of  the ongoing, severe suffering caused to women by existing abortion laws
and the consistent refusal of  both Stormont and Westminster to respond to it,
notwithstanding the repeated condemnations from human rights bodies noted above and
the UK government’s own recognition of  safe, legal abortion as a basic human right in
other contexts.195 If  the equal rights apparently promised to Northern Irish women in the
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Belfast Agreement are still to be achieved some 20 years on,196 then it is time to pursue
those rights elsewhere.
We noted above a long-standing debate about whether the EU and its law are good
for women.197 This has, in part, reflected broader concerns regarding both the balance
between the EU’s economic and social agendas198 and the extent to which supposedly
remote, unelected European elites have developed and imposed laws and policies that are
unreflective of  local needs and values.199 EU health law and policy has here been
criticised specifically for its harmful impact on the social settlements expressed in national
health systems, including the potential undermining of  a financial sustainability grounded
in limiting access to medical treatment through gatekeeper medical professionals.200 In
that discussion, individual rights claims under EU law are characterised as those of
consumers or providers of  services operating within markets and asserting individual
interests which ignore, or are actively harmful to, social solidarity.201 Similar debates arise
from the proposed application of  trade agreements, such as TTIP, to medical services.
Without wanting to over-claim from the specifics of  the rather different case we have
considered above, we take the view that further reflection on whose solidarity is invoked
and on what terms it has been achieved is worthwhile. The law of  the internal market
itself  expresses European notions of  social and moral values that are irreducible to mere
economic rights. Far from acting as self-serving, individualist economic actors in the EU’s
market, the women at the heart of  our analysis are asserting not merely trade-based
principles of  free movement of  services, but also rights to human dignity, bodily integrity,
liberty and security, private and family life, and equality and non-discrimination. The work
of  WoW and WHW is profoundly and explicitly grounded in a concern for social justice
and in an ethic of  solidarity with the women they serve, which cut across national
boundaries. Our analysis suggests that, at least in this one specific case, the EU might
offer important support for broad social solidarities, providing additional opportunities
for contestation where other legal arguments have been unsuccessful. In this instance,
transnational trade law may have the potential to facilitate – rather than to limit – the
promotion of  women’s reproductive health, social equality and citizenship rights.
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